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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review summarizes important 
decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court.  The purpose of the 
Review is to indicate cases of first impression, cases of significantly altered 
earlier interpretations of North Dakota law, and other cases of interest.  As a 
special project, Associate Editors assist in researching and writing the 
Review.1 The following topics are included in the Review: 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – RIGHT TO ABORTION – STATE V. 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
MKB Management v. Burdick 
 
By per curiam opinion in MKB Management v. Burdick,2 the North 
Dakota Supreme Court agreed that there was not sufficient majority among 
them to declare unconstitutional a statute that restricted medication 
abortions, which resulted in overturning the district court’s enjoinment of 
the State enforcing the law.3  Four out of the five justices are needed to 
declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional, and only three justices 
were of the opinion that this particular enactment was unconstitutional.4 
There were four separate opinions issued in this case.5  Chief Justice 
VandeWalle held that the statute was constitutional under both the state and 
federal constitutions.6  Justice Kapsner and then Judge Maring held that the 
law was unconstitutional under the state and federal constitutions.7  Justice 
Crothers held that the law was unconstitutional under the federal 
constitution and that no analysis was required under the state constitution.8  
Justice Sandstrom held that the law was constitutional under the state 
 
2.  2014 ND 197, 855 N.W.2d 31 (per curiam). 
3.  Id. ¶ 1, 855 N.W.2d at 31. 
4.  Id.  
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Id. 
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constitution and that any analysis under the federal constitution was not 
properly before the court.9 
During the 2011 North Dakota legislative session, the Legislative 
Assembly passed a provision to amend the North Dakota Abortion Control 
Act.10  The amendment provided a ban on certain abortion-inducing 
prescriptions that are not authorized and tested by the FDA, required 
physicians providing these medications to have to contract with another 
physician for emergencies, and required that the medication be 
administered in the same room and presence of the prescribing physician.11  
Red River Women’s Clinic, the only clinic to provide abortion services in 
North Dakota, sought a declaration from district court that the provision 
was unconstitutional under the North Dakota Constitution.12  The clinic 
provided two prescription drugs for its medication abortions, and only 
twenty percent of its patients use the medication-based abortion method.13 
The first prescription drug, mifepristone, blocks a hormone needed to 
sustain the pregnancy14 and results in the fetus detaching from the uterus.15 
The second prescription drug, misoprostol, assists the uterus in 
contracting16 to expel the fetus out of the body.17  The medication abortion 
is only administered before nine weeks of pregnancy.18  While the FDA 
approved the use of the two medications together, the drugs have several 
variations of off-label use that is not reviewed by the FDA.19  The clinic 
used the medications off-label, which the FDA did not prohibit.20 
The district court entered judgment that enjoined the State from 
enforcing House Bill 1297, due to the likelihood that the plaintiffs would 
prevail in the state constitutional challenge.21  In determining this 
likelihood, the court reviewed the case under the undue burden standard 
from Planned Parenthood v. Casey22 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.23  In addition, the district court also relied on the 
 
9.  Id. 
10.  Id. ¶ 4, 855 N.W.2d at 32 (VandeWalle, C.J., opinion). 
11.  Id. ¶ 8, 855 N.W.2d at 34. 
12.  Id. ¶ 5, 855 N.W.2d at 32. 
13.  Id. ¶ 65, 855 N.W.2d at 54. 
14.  Id. ¶ 66. 
15.  Id. ¶ 6, 855 N.W.2d at 33. 
16.  Id. ¶ 66, 855 N.W.2d at 54. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. ¶ 5, 855 N.W.2d at 52. 
19.  Id. ¶ 6, 855 N.W.2d at 33. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. ¶ 10. 
22.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
23.  MKB Mgmt., ¶ 10, 855 N.W.2d at 35. 
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North Dakota Constitution and noted that the state constitution provided 
more expansive due process rights.24  Ultimately, the district court applied 
strict scrutiny and found the plaintiffs were likely to prevail for three 
reasons.25 
First, the court found the amendment effectively banned all medication 
abortions because one of the drugs was used off-label.26  Second, the court 
found it impossible for a physician to abide with the emergency services 
contract requirement.27  Finally, the court found it impossible, due to 
staffing concerns, to always have the prescribing physician in the same 
room as the medication abortion.28  As a result, the district court found that 
the amendment failed the strict scrutiny standard and the plaintiffs were 
likely to prevail.29  The district court further stated that the amendment was 
unconstitutional under the federal constitution because it was an undue 
burden on the right to an abortion before viability.30  The Chief 
Administrator of the North Dakota Department of Health appealed the 
judgment that enjoined enforcement of House Bill 1297, arguing that there 
was no fundamental right to an abortion under the state’s constitution.31 
Chief Justice VandeWalle found that the district court erred in 
determining a fundamental right to abortion exists under the North Dakota 
Constitution and in applying strict scrutiny to House Bill 1297.32  Chief 
Justice VandeWalle first analyzed the federal constitutional issue.33  He 
mentioned that in Roe v. Wade,34 the United States Supreme Court 
concluded an individual’s right to privacy was broad enough to include the 
right to an abortion.35  He cautioned that the Court also stated any right to 
an abortion was not an absolute right and that the states may still have an 
interest in limiting abortions.36 
Next, Chief Justice VandeWalle noted that Casey utilized the undue 
burden standard, not strict scrutiny, to analyze abortion regulations,37 which 
the Court adopted out of deference to the state’s important and legitimate 
 
24.  Id. 
25.  Id.  
26.  Id. 
27.  Id.  
28.  Id. 
29.  Id.  
30.  Id. ¶ 11. 
31.  Id. ¶ 4, 855 N.W.2d at 32. 
32.  Id.  
33.  Id. ¶ 15, 855 N.W.2d at 36.  
34.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
35.  MKB Mgmt., ¶ 15, 855 N.W.2d at 36. 
36.  Id.  
37.  Id. ¶ 16. 
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interests in a woman’s health.38  The undue burden standard prevents the 
government from placing an undue burden upon a woman’s right to an 
abortion if a regulation’s “purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle 
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains 
viability.”39 
In Gonzales v. Carhart,40 the Court found that a law banning partial-
birth abortions did not provide a substantial obstacle for a woman seeking 
an abortion because it was only one type of abortion procedure.41  The 
Court stated regulating the medical profession and promoting respect for 
life justified the state in allowing or banning certain practices.42  The Court 
additionally observed that there was no undue burden because alternative 
abortion procedures existed.43 
After this survey of precedent under the federal constitution, Chief 
Justice VandeWalle analyzed precedent under the state constitution44 and 
recognized that there are inherent rights under the state constitution.45  The 
Chief Justice outlined a few cases showing an individual’s liberty and the 
state’s interest of police power do not always require the strict scrutiny 
standard.46  Some states have declared abortion a fundamental right and 
subject to strict scrutiny under their respective constitutions even though 
their constitutions are silent on the matter.47  The Chief Justice opined that 
because there is no provision under the North Dakota Constitution 
specifically referencing a right to an abortion,48 there was no intention to 
create a fundamental right to abortion that would entail a review of strict 
scrutiny.49 
Accordingly, Chief Justice VandeWalle then reviewed the challenged 
House Bill 1297 under the federal constitution’s undue burden standard.50 
He recognized that despite the state constitution not providing a right to 
abortion, there is still the right to obtain an abortion under the federal 
constitution.51  The contended language of the enactment was the 
 
38.  Id. ¶ 17, 855 N.W.2d at 37-39. 
39.  Id.  
40.  550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
41.  MKB Mgmt., ¶¶ 19-20, 855 N.W.2d at 39-40. 
42.  Id. ¶ 20, 855 N.W.2d at 40. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id. ¶ 22, 855 N.W.2d at 41. 
45.  Id. ¶ 27, 855 N.W.2d at 42. 
46.  Id. ¶¶ 27-31, 855 N.W.2d at 42-44. 
47.  Id. ¶ 32, 855 N.W.2d at 44. 
48.  Id. ¶¶ 33-35, 855 N.W.2d at 44-45.  
49.  Id. ¶ 38. 
50.  Id. ¶ 41, 855 N.W.2d at 46. 
51.  Id. 
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requirement of FDA approval,52 as the FDA had not approved the two 
prescription drugs to be used together for medication abortions.53  The 
legislative history did not indicate an intention to ban all drugs used for 
abortions, just the drugs that have not been tested and authorized by the 
FDA.54  Because the FDA had approved the two medications used by the 
clinic, the Chief Justice opined that it was improper for the district court to 
conclude House Bill 1297 banned all medication abortions.55 
After this analysis, the Chief Justice turned to precedent from other 
jurisdictions that had applied the undue burden standard.56  In Planned 
Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region v. DeWine,57 the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld an Ohio statute that required the FDA approved dosage 
requirements and gestational time limits.58  The court found that these 
regulations were not an undue burden because the woman still had the 
option for surgical abortion.59  Moreover, the court observed that the right 
to choose an abortion does not confer the right to choose the method.60  In 
Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Humble,61 the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals invalidated an Arizona regulation requiring FDA approval for 
medication abortions because Arizona provided no evidence of its interest 
in the woman’s health.62  Chief Justice VandeWalle chose to follow 
DeWine’s reasoning because he believed it showed the proper deference 
afforded to the state’s interest in a woman’s health.63  Using DeWine’s 
reasoning, the Chief Justice found there was enough evidence to show that 
on its face, the House Bill 1297 furthered the state’s interest in protecting 
women against the dangers of off-label uses of abortion drugs.64 
The Chief Justice also observed that the other provisions of House Bill 
1297 failed to create an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion.65 
He rejected the contention that requiring abortion providers to have an 
emergency services contract with another physician created any type of 
 
52.  Id. ¶ 47, 855 N.W.2d at 48. 
53.  Id.  
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. ¶¶ 47-48, 855 N.W.2d at 48-49. 
56.  Id. ¶ 51, 855 N.W.2d at 49-50. 
57.  696 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2012). 
58.  MKB Mgmt., ¶ 52, 855 N.W.2d at 50. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. 
61.  753 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2014). 
62.  MKB Mgmt., ¶ 54, 855 N.W.2d at 51. 
63.  Id. ¶ 55. 
64.  Id. ¶ 57. 
65.  Id. ¶ 58, 855 N.W.2d at 52. 
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substantial obstacle.66  Although the district court found the contract had to 
be exclusive, the Chief Justice found that the plain language did not require 
it to be so.67  Based upon the foregoing, Chief Justice VandeWalle found 
House Bill 1297 constitutional under both the state and federal 
constitutions, and he would have reversed the district court’s opinion in all 
respects.68  Furthermore, the Chief Justice found that under article VI, 
section 4 of the North Dakota Constitution, four justices are required to rule 
a legislative enactment unconstitutional.69 
Justice Kapsner, joined by then Surrogate Judge Maring,70 wrote a 
separate opinion agreeing with the district court that there is a fundamental 
right to an abortion under the North Dakota Constitution, such that strict 
scrutiny was the appropriate standard and that House Bill 1297 banned all 
medication abortions.71  Justice Kapsner took the position that the case 
should not be about the right to abortion because such a right already exists 
under federal law.72  Justice Kapsner was of the opinion that this case 
should more properly be viewed as a dispute about a woman’s right to 
consult with her physician and make informed medical decisions.73  She 
concluded that legislation should not be an obstacle with these decisions, 
especially when a woman cannot have a surgical abortion.74 Moreover, 
Justice Kapsner opined that this case involved the “doctor’s right to practice 
good medicine without fear of prosecution.”75 
Justice Kapsner began her analysis by interpreting the statutory 
language as enacted by House Bill 1297.76  She concluded that the law 
created a “de facto” ban on medication abortions.77  She observed that the 
FDA only approved one of the drugs for medical abortions.78  However, the 
second, unapproved drug was necessary to complete the abortion for about 
93% of cases.79  Therefore, in Justice Kapsner’s opinion, the law created a 
 
66.  Id. ¶ 49, 855 N.W.2d at 49. 
67.  Id.  
68.  Id. ¶ 4, 855 N.W.2d at 32. 
69.  Id. ¶ 60, 855 N.W.2d at 52. 
70.  Although Justice Maring retired by the time the time the North Dakota Supreme Court 
rendered this decision, she took part in the decision because she was on the court when the court 
heard this appeal. 
71.  Id. ¶ 63, 855 N.W.2d at 53 (Kapsner, J., opinion).   
72.  Id. ¶ 64. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. ¶ 75, 855 N.W.2d at 56. 
77.  Id. ¶ 78, 855 N.W.2d at 58. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. 
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de facto ban on abortion.80  Furthermore, she found the enactment was a 
complete ban for any woman who could not have a surgical abortion.81 
With this conclusion, Justice Kapsner turned to the questions of 
whether there is a fundamental right to an abortion under the state 
constitution and whether House Bill 1297 should be analyzed under the 
strict scrutiny or undue burden standard.82  First, Justice Kapsner opined 
there is a fundamental right under the state constitution to choose an 
abortion.83  In doing so, she noted that the state constitution does not 
parallel the federal constitution because the state constitution creates a more 
expansive liberty under article I, section 1.84  Justice Kapsner looked to 
other states that have constitutions similar to North Dakota and whether 
such states recognize a right to an abortion.85  She found that eleven states 
with such constitutions recognize a fundamental right to an abortion and 
most use the strict scrutiny standard.86  However, some of these states still 
use the undue burden standard.87  Additionally, some states allow the right 
to abortion under the right to privacy.88  Justice Kapsner also pointed out 
that North Dakota recognizes a person’s liberty interests in refusing 
unwanted medical treatment, personal autonomy, and self-determination.89 
Moreover, Justice Kapsner concluded that the contended legislation 
impedes on this self-determination and the doctor’s right to give medical 
advice.90 
Next, Justice Kapsner applied the strict scrutiny standard.91  To survive 
the strict scrutiny test, the government must have a compelling interest, and 
the restriction must be narrowly tailored to effectuate such interest.92 
Kapsner found that the concern for maternal health was not a compelling 
state interest.93  The State argued that its interest was for the protection of 
“the health of women seeking abortions.”94  The State claimed that 
abortions are unique to other medical procedures and require unique 
 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. ¶ 79. 
82.  Id. ¶¶ 83-84, 855 N.W.2d at 59. 
83.  Id. ¶ 85, 855 N.W.2d at 59-60. 
84.  Id. ¶ 86, 855 N.W.2d at 60. 
85.  Id. ¶¶ 93-96, 855 N.W.2d at 62-64. 
86.  Id. ¶ 93, 855 N.W.2d at 62-63. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. ¶ 96, 855 N.W.2d at 64. 
89.  Id. ¶ 98. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. ¶ 100, 855 N.W.2d at 65. 
92.  Id. 
93.  Id. ¶ 111, 855 N.W.2d at 72. 
94.  Id. ¶ 101, 855 N.W.2d at 65. 
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remedies.95  Courts have recognized the state’s interest in maternal health 
for abortion, but only during a time when abortions were considered very 
unsafe and dangerous.96 
Justice Kapsner pointed out that with medical advancement, abortions 
are safe and only require regulation similar to that of other medical 
procedures.97  In this case, the evidence at the district court and an amicus 
brief on appeal showed that there was no safety reason to limit medication 
abortions.98  Justice Kapsner found that the law was also not narrowly 
tailored to address the State’s interest99 because it did not promote women’s 
health.100  She was of the opinion that if the law failed to promote women’s 
health, it could not be narrow enough to satisfy this test.101 
Justice Kapsner reviewed the enactment under the undue burden test.102  
She found this test appropriate because the plaintiffs brought the action 
under sections of the state constitution that mirrored language with the 
federal constitution.103  Roe used strict scrutiny analysis to evaluate the 
right to have an abortion before viability.104  In Casey, the Court turned 
away from strict scrutiny to use the undue burden standard.105  That 
standard provides that if the “state regulation has the purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of 
a nonviable fetus,” then that state regulation is unconstitutional.106  The 
Court upheld this test in Gonzales, which held that prohibiting partial-birth 
abortions, where the fetus is removed in intact, but allowing a fetus to be 
removed in parts was not an undue burden.107 
Utilizing the undue burden standard, Justice Kapsner reviewed the 
purpose and effect of House Bill 1297.108  The state offered that the purpose 
of the amendment was to protect women’s health.109  However, courts 
cannot just take such an assertion at face value and must ensure that the 
 
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. ¶¶ 103-104, 855 N.W.2d at 66. 
97.  Id. ¶ 105. 
98.  Id. ¶¶ 107-108, 855 N.W.2d at 67-71. 
99.  Id. ¶ 113, 855 N.W.2d at 72. 
100.  Id. ¶ 112. 
101.  Id.  
102.  Id. ¶ 114. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. ¶ 115, 855 N.W.2d at 73 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, at 117-18 (1973)). 
105.  Id. ¶ 116 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871-72 (1992)). 
106.  Id. ¶ 117 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-79). 
107.  Id. ¶¶ 118-19, 855 N.W.2d at 74-75. 
108.  Id. ¶ 120, 855 N.W.2d at 75. 
109.  Id. 
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purpose is actually served by the legislation.110  In doing so, the court 
would need to weigh the rationale for the law and the burden the law 
imposes.111 
Justice Kapsner agreed that the district court properly weighed the 
evidence that was presented regarding the rationale of the law versus its 
burden.112  She agreed that the legislation did not protect women’s health 
when the legislation required the strict use of the FDA label when off-label 
use is common practice in the medical community.113  She also noted that 
the North Dakota law has allowed the off-label use of other medications 
and even requires health insurance to cover such use.114  Furthermore, 
Justice Kapsner found that the emergency contract provision in House Bill 
1297, which requires abortion-providing doctors to contract with another 
physician for emergency services, did not protect women’s health.115 
Justice Kapsner found the “de facto ban” on medication abortions 
created a substantial obstacle for a woman seeking pre-viability abortion.116  
The district court found that there were some women who cannot medically 
have the surgical abortion.117  Also, victims of abuse may find medication 
abortions less traumatizing and such treatment may be necessary for their 
emotional health.118  The legislation’s ban of off-label uses of one of the 
drugs also created a substantial obstacle for women seeking pre-viability 
abortions.119 The use of the two drugs was the standard of care for 
medication abortions.120  The only drug that would be allowed under the 
new legislation is considered a “relic” in the medical community.121  The 
plaintiffs offered evidence that the two drugs at issue were safer than the 
older drug.122  Based on the foregoing district court findings, Justice 
Kapsner found that House Bill 1297 created a substantial obstacle for 
women seeking a pre-viability abortion.123 
 
110.  Id. 
111.  Id. ¶¶ 121-23, 855 N.W.2d at 75-76. 
112.  Id. ¶ 125, 855 N.W.2d at 76. 
113.  Id. ¶¶ 126-32, 855 N.W.2d at 76-79. 
114.  Id. ¶ 133, 855 N.W.2d at 79. 
115.  Id. ¶ 140, 855 N.W.2d at 81. 
116.  Id. ¶ 142, 855 N.W.2d at 83. 
117.  Id. ¶ 141, 855 N.W.2d at 81. 
118.  Id. at 82-83. 
119.  Id. ¶ 143, 855 N.W.2d at 83. 
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. at 84. 
122.  Id. at 84-85. 
 123.   Id. ¶ 145, 855 N.W.2d at 83. 
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Justice Kapsner was of the opinion that state could not offer much, if 
any, evidence that showed the older drug protected women’s health.124  The 
effect of having the emergency contract provision did not protect women’s 
health.125  This provision would be impossible to fulfill, as no other 
physician would be willing to enter in such a contract.126  Also, emergency 
services are rarely needed.127  Justice Kapsner also stated that because the 
U.S. Constitution is supreme to the state constitution, the four-justice 
minimum required to overrule a legislative enactment as stated in the North 
Dakota Constitution is trumped.128  Based upon the foregoing, Justice 
Kapsner would have affirmed the appeal.129 
Justice Crothers offered his separate opinion, concurring that the statute 
was unconstitutional under the federal constitution, which made it 
unnecessary to analyze the issues under state law.130  He believed that 
because this was a constitutional issue, the court was “obliged to adhere to 
our established principles.”131  In beginning his analysis, Justice Crothers 
noted the fundamental principle that the North Dakota Constitution can 
confer rights in addition to those afforded by the federal constitution, but it 
cannot grant fewer rights than the federal constitution.132  This principle 
originates in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.133 
The second principle Crothers mentioned was the restraint that courts 
must exercise in deciding on constitutional questions “in advance of the 
necessity of deciding them,” in order to avoid advisory opinions.134  He also 
opined that the issue must first survive the federal constitution in order to be 
decided under state precedent, as the federal constitution sets the floor in 
regards to individual rights.135  Crothers then noted his concurring 
agreement with Justice Kapsner’s federal analysis, and therefore concluded 
there was nothing to decide under the state constitution.136  Finally, Justice 
Crothers opined that because only three justice concluded the enactment 
 
124.  Id. ¶ 143, 855 N.W.2d at 85-86. 
125.  Id. ¶ 146, 855 N.W.2d at 88. 
126.  Id.  
127.  Id. 
128.  Id. ¶¶ 151-55, 855 N.W.2d at 89. 
129.  Id. ¶ 150. 
130.  Id. ¶ 157, 855 N.W.2d at 91 (Crothers, J., opinion). 
131.  Id. ¶ 161, 855 N.W.2d at 92. 
132.  Id. 
133.  Id.  
134.  Id. ¶¶ 162-63, 855 N.W.2d at 92-93 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective 
Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1998)). 
135.  Id. ¶ 164, 855 N.W.2d at 93. 
136.  Id. ¶ 165, 855 N.W.2d at 94. 
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was unconstitutional, an insufficient majority, the district court’s judgement 
declaring H.B. 1297 unconstitutional should be reversed. 
In Justice Sandstrom’s separate opinion, he commented that the sole 
issue brought before the court was the constitutionality of the statute under 
the North Dakota Constitution, not the federal constitution.137  He noted 
that none of the parties mentioned federal constitution arguments; rather, 
the plaintiffs exclusively sought to challenge the statute under the North 
Dakota Constitution.138  As such, Justice Sandstrom was unwilling to 
address the argument that the statute violated the federal constitution 
because it was never pled or tried by consent.139  He then opined that Chief 
Justice VandeWalle had a persuasive argument of the constitutionality of 
House Bill 1297 under the North Dakota Constitution.140  Finally, Justice 
Sandstrom agreed with Chief Justice VandeWalle and Justice Crothers “that 
the statute has not been declared unconstitutional under either constitution 














137.  Id. ¶ 168 (Sandstrom, J., opinion). 
138.  Id. ¶ 169. 
139.  Id. ¶ 166, 855 N.W.2d at 94. 
140.  Id. ¶ 170, 855 N.W.2d at 94-95. 
141.  Id. ¶ 184, 855 N.W.2d at 98. 
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CONTRACTS – CONSIDERATIONS OF FORBEARANCE – 
QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY 
Finstad v. Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc. 
 
In Finstad v. Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc.,142 the North Dakota 
Supreme Court reversed the district court judgment because the district 
court erred as a matter of law when it ruled that John and Lori Finstad were 
relieved, due to the economic duress doctrine, from meeting the 
requirements of an agreement and release contract.143  The Finstads owned 
a tract of land and granted Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc., known as 
Southwest Water Users District (“District”), an option to purchase said 
land.144  As part of the option, the Finstads were allowed to lease back the 
property for five years and had the right of first refusal to lease the property 
for an additional five years.145  After some unsanctioned land use by the 
Finstads transpired, the District terminated the Finstads’ lease-back 
rights.146 
To maintain Production Flexibility Contract (“PFC”) payments on the 
property, the Finstads and the District executed a farm rental contract and 
an “Agreement and Release” contract.147  Allegedly, because the Finstads 
were undergoing economic difficulties causing them a great deal of stress at 
the time, they choose not to argue with the District over the provisions of 
the agreement and release.148  The Finstads eventually sued the District, in 
part, because they claimed that the “District obtained the agreement and 
release through fraud, duress or coercion.”149 
The district court found that the agreement and release “was legally 
ineffective” because it was procured under economic duress.150  As a result, 
the court rescinded the agreement and release and determined that the 
Finstads did not violate the lease agreement by using the land, such that the 
District inappropriately prevented the Finstads from exercising their lease-
back rights.151  The district court also awarded the Finstads $53,000.99 in 
damages and interest.152  The Finstads appealed the district court’s decision, 
 
142.  2014 ND 146, 849 N.W.2d 165. 
143.  Id. ¶ 1, 849 N.W.2d at 166. 
144.  Id. ¶ 2. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Id. ¶ 3, 849 N.W.2d at 167. 
147.  Id. ¶ 4.  
148.  Id. ¶ 5, 849 N.W.2d at 168. 
149.  Id. ¶ 6. 
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because they believed they were owed more damages, and the District 
cross-appealed.153  The court addressed only the cross-appeal issue as to 
whether the “court erred in rescinding the agreement and release based on 
the economic duress doctrine.”154 
The court contemplated and determined that North Dakota does not 
recognize the economic duress doctrine.155  North Dakota statutes require 
“consent of the parties” for a valid contract.156  This consent must be “free,” 
meaning that it cannot be obtained through duress.157  North Dakota law 
defines “duress” in North Dakota Century Code section 9-03-05, which 
requires physical action to find that there is duress.158  Because the elements 
necessary to determine economic duress did not exist in the statute, the 
court refused to adopt the economic duress doctrine, reasoning that 
although there may be policy reasons for adopting the doctrine, its adoption 
should be up to the legislature, not the courts, to decide.159  The legislature, 
at the time the case was decided, had not recognized the economic duress 
doctrine.160 
The Finstads also argued that the assignment and release did not have 
lawful consideration because it was merely a “sham rental agreement” 
meant to “secure PFC payments on the land.”161  The court explained that 
because the contracts themselves were not inherently illegal, the contracts 
are not void for illegality.162  The court found there was adequate 
consideration for the agreement and release contract because the agreement 
stated that the Finstads received “consideration in the form of ‘the right to 
collect all government payments available for 2001.’”163  Ultimately, 
because North Dakota does not recognize the economic duress doctrine, the 
agreement and release contract was valid, thereby preventing the Finstads’ 
action, which prompted the court to reverse the district court judgment.164 
 
153.  Id. ¶ 8. 
154.  Id. 
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES – FORFEITURES – PRESCRIPTION 
DEFENSE UNRECOGNIZED 
State v. Kuruc 
 
In State v. Kuruc,165 defendants Rebecca Larson and Brian Kuruc both 
appealed after conditionally pleading guilty to possession of marijuana with 
intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia.166  Kuruc also had a 
charge of tampering with physical evidence.167  Both filed motions to 
suppress evidence and provided their Washington medical marijuana 
prescriptions as a defense to the crimes of possession and possession with 
intent to deliver.168  The district court denied both the motions to suppress 
and the defense proffered by Larson and Kuruc.169  This review only 
discusses the applicability of medical marijuana prescriptions as a defense. 
On the morning of January 9, 2013, the Cass County Sheriff’s office 
received a call from a front desk clerk at the Days Inn hotel in Casselton, 
North Dakota, complaining of a marijuana odor emanating from one of 
their rooms, which was occupied by Larson and Kuruc.170  Officers arrived 
and spoke with the front desk, where they learned that the occupants had 
requested a 1:00 p.m. checkout time and that there were about six people in 
the room.171  The officers could smell an odor of marijuana in the lobby, 
and as they followed the scent to the room, the odor became “significantly 
stronger.”172 
A deputy knocked on the door, and Kuruc answered and denied the 
deputy permission to investigate the complaint.173  Kuruc tried to close the 
door, but the deputy wedged her foot in the way to prevent the door from 
closing.174  The officers lacked a warrant at this time, but were preventing 
the door from closing.175  The deputy informed everyone in the room they 
were not free to leave and again asked to enter and was denied.176 
 
165.  2014 ND 95, 846 N.W.2d 314. 
166.  Id. ¶ 1, 846 N.W.2d at 317. 
167.  Id. 
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It was at this time that Larson offered that she had a medical marijuana 
prescription from the State of Washington and that there might be 
marijuana located in her rental car.177  Upon hearing this information, a 
deputy called to get a warrant for the premises.178  Meanwhile, the deputy in 
the doorway observed Kuruc bring a large duffle bag to the bathroom and 
lock the door.179  The deputy pushed passed the door and observed Kuruc 
trying to flush marijuana down the toilet.180  Kuruc was arrested and the 
other occupants were detained in the hallway and read their Miranda 
rights.181  A search warrant was obtained, and during the search, officers 
discovered marijuana and paraphernalia in the room and contraband in 
Larson’s vehicle.182 
The district court denied Larson’s and Kuruc’s motion in limine to 
enter their prescriptions as evidence, and the North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed.183  Larson and Kuruc argued the district court abused its 
discretion by refusing their motion in limine to admit individual medical 
marijuana prescriptions from the State of Washington and that this was a 
lawful defense under North Dakota’s Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
(“NDUCSA”).184  The North Dakota Supreme Court reviews motions in 
limine under the abuse of discretion standard, and reverses only where the 
district court acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable 
manner.185 
Larson and Kuruc argued that possessing a controlled substance 
pursuant to a prescription was a valid defense.186  They argued under 
Washington law they were allowed to each possess up to twenty-four 
ounces per their prescriptions, which was prescribed by a licensed 
neuropathic doctor in Washington.187  They further contend that because the 
prescription was lawfully obtained under Washington law, they were 
lawfully in possession of marijuana, which would be a defense against the 
charges of possession and possession with an intent to deliver.188 
 
177.  Id. 
178.  Id. 
179.  Id. ¶ 5. 
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The court began by discussing marijuana’s schedule I classification 
under NDUCSA.189  In North Dakota, to be classified as a schedule I 
controlled substance, the substance must “1. Ha[ve] a high potential for 
abuse; and 2. Ha[ve] no accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States or lack[] accepted safety for use in treatment under medical 
supervision.”190  The NDUCSA contains a prescription exception that 
allows a person to possess a controlled substances if “the substance was 
obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a 
practitioner while acting in the course of the practitioner’s professional 
practice.”191  The burden of proving this exception is on the party asserting 
it.192 
The court defined a “valid prescription” as “a prescription that is issued 
for a legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of professional practice 
by a: (1) Practitioner who has conducted at least one in-person medical 
evaluation of the patient; or (2) Covering practitioner.”193  A practitioner is 
defined as a “person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted by the 
jurisdiction in which the individual is practicing to distribute, dispense, 
conduct research with respect to, or to administer a controlled substance in 
the course of professional practice or research.”194  The district court 
reviewed the “no accepted medical use” language in the definition of a 
schedule I drug and the language used in the valid prescription exception 
and finally resorted to statutory interpretation to resolve the apparent 
conflict.195  The district court reasoned that “[c]onstruction of the relevant 
statutes is harmonized by the interpretation the valid prescription defense 
only applies to substances listed on the schedules II through IV” because 
the language describing those schedules states the substance has a 
“currently accepted medical use.”196 
Beginning its analysis, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that 
statutory interpretation is a question of law and that statutes must be 
construed as a whole, interpreted in context to give meaning and effect to 
every word, phrase, and sentence, and the context of the statutes and the 
purposes for which they were enacted must be considered.197  If general 
provisions conflict with specific provisions of another statute, the court 
 
189.  Id. ¶ 28. 
190.  Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-04 (2013)). 
191.  Id. ¶ 29. 
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193.  Id. 
194.  Id. 
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must attempt to give effect to both.198  And “[w]hen statutes relate to the 
same subject matter, this Court makes every effort to harmonize and give 
meaningful effect to each statute.”199 
Here, the court concluded that the “plain language of the act does not 
provide for a medical marijuana prescription defense” after construing and 
harmonizing the prescription exception with the schedule I language.200  
The court looked to the North Dakota Board of Pharmacy’s determination 
that marijuana has a “high potential for abuse, and no accepted medical use 
in treatment in the United States or lacks accepted safety for use in 
treatment under medical supervision” that was codified by the legislature.201 
Essentially, the court felt it could not be put in a situation where North 
Dakota would have to legally recognize out-of-state marijuana prescriptions 
when such prescriptions would not be legal for its own citizens.202 
The court went on further to point out that not only is medical 
marijuana illegal in North Dakota, but it also remains illegal under federal 
law.203 Even under federal law marijuana has no accepted medical use.204 
Using the Supremacy Clause, the court reasoned that the Washington 
medical marijuana prescriptions are contrary to federal law, and therefore 
the “district court properly construed the North Dakota statute” and 
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES – SEARCHES AND SEIZURES – 
POLICE OFFICERS AND PROBABLE CAUSE 
State v. Otto 
 
In State v. Otto,206 the North Dakota Supreme Court decided a case of 
first impression, holding that the automobile exception applies to a camper, 
and, as a result, probable cause was sufficient to search the camper without 
a warrant.207  On July 26, Police Officer Vetter observed a camper that was 
located in a parking lot and appeared to have some kind of light flashing 
around inside of it.208  After backup arrived, Officer Vetter and two other 
officers approached the camper and immediately noticed a strong odor of 
marijuana.209  An individual, later identified to be Loretta Stroud, emerged 
from the camper and stated there was no one else inside.210  It was soon 
discovered that Wayne Otto was in the trailer, who was subsequently 
arrested for an outstanding warrant.211 
Without having been granted a search warrant, Officer Vetter and 
Sergeant Hellman decided to do a sweep of the trailer without Otto’s 
consent because they were concerned for their safety.212  During the sweep, 
they observed a shoebox full of marijuana and what appeared to be zip-lock 
baggies filled with meth.213  As a result, Otto was charged with three drug-
related offenses.214  Although Otto moved to dismiss the charges and 
suppress the evidence derived from the warrantless search of the camper, 
the district court denied his motion, deciding that the safety sweep was 
“properly conducted for exigent circumstances present at the scene.”215 
Wayne Otto appealed the district court decision to deny his motion to 
suppress evidence obtained during the warrantless search of camper.216 
It was Otto’s contention that the mere possible presence of other 
individuals in the camper failed to create the proper exigent circumstances 
to justify a safety sweep of the camper, which Otto claimed to be his 
residence.217  Instead of using the validity of the safety sweep to uphold the 
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district court decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the  
decision on another basis properly before it: the validity of the search based 
on the automobile exception.218  The court reiterated that officers can search 
an automobile for illegal contraband without a warrant if probable cause 
exists.219  For the court, the question was whether the camper in this case 
qualified as an automobile.220  The court reviewed the justifications for the 
automobile exception delineated in California v. Carney,221 which includes 
the “inherently mobile” nature of the automobile and the “lesser expectation 
of privacy” in automobiles.222  In applying the automobile exception to the 
camper, the court referred to variables considered by the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals in United States v. Navas,223 which explained that “[e]ven 
where there is little practical likelihood that the vehicle will be driven away, 
the [automobile] exception applies.”224 
Because the court not only accepted the automobile exception 
reasoning laid out in Carney, but also the federal courts’ inclusion of 
campers in interpreting Carney, the court held that the automobile 
exception applied to Otto’s camper.225  Additionally, the two Carney 
justifications were met.226  Although the camper was detached from a 
vehicle, had attached plugs, and its landing gear down, the court 
nevertheless determined that the camper “was capable of being mobilized 
within a very short time.”227  Furthermore, being that the camper was 
located in a commercial parking lot, it was not in a location normally 
associated with or used for “residential purposes.”228  For these reasons, it 
was determined that the camper could properly be classified as an 
automobile. 
Finally, the court determined that the automobile exception applied to 
Otto’s camper because probable caused existed making the search 
permissible.229  Probable cause was found because of Officer Vetter’s 
testimony that in nearing the camper, she smelled “a very strong odor of 
marijuana coming from the camper.”230  The probable cause, combined 
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with the determination by the court that Otto’s camper fell “within the 
scope of the automobile exception,” lead the court to affirm the judgment of 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – SEARCHES AND SEIZURES – 
CURTILAGE 
State v. Nguyen 
 
In State v. Nguyen,231 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the 
use of a drug-sniffing dog in a secure apartment hallway does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.232 
The court reversed and remanded the trial court’s suppression of 
evidence.233 
Nguyen was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to 
deliver and drug paraphernalia.234  The facts of the case were never in 
dispute.235  On November 8, 2012, law enforcement officers were called to 
an apartment building located on Villa Drive South, Fargo, North Dakota, 
after a tenant complained of smelling marijuana on the second floor of the 
building.236  The building was added to a list of properties to be investigated 
further because the officers were unable to identify the source of the 
odor.237  On December 9, 2012, an officer with the narcotics division and an 
officer with the K-9 unit conducted further investigation using Earl, a drug-
sniffing dog.238  Because the apartment building in question had locked 
main entrances and restricted access, tenants were given keys and guests 
could only gain access by tenants electronically opening the door.239 
Tenants in the apartment building shared secured, common hallways and 
often left personal property, such as shoes, bikes, and other craftwork, in 
this common hallway.240 
Officers gained access by catching the door before it closed after a 
tenant either left or entered the building.241  Officers brought Earl into the 
building and first swept the third floor hallway, where nothing was 
detected.242  Officers then brought Earl to the second floor hallway, where 
Earl was immediately alerted to the door of unit 214.243  Using this 
information from the drug-sniffing dog sweep, officers obtained a search 
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warrant and executed it on December 12, 2012.244  During the search, 
“officers seized approximately one-half pound of marijuana, paraphernalia 
including a snort tube, two digital scales, a grinder, two glass bongs, two 
glass pipes, and $2,433 in cash, which were all attributed to Nguyen” after 
he made incriminating statements when questioned by officers.245 
On April 29, 2013, an evidentiary hearing was held after “Nguyen 
moved to suppress the evidence arguing the warrantless sweep of the 
apartment building that formed the basis for the search warrant constituted 
an illegal search.”246  He also argued suppression was appropriate because 
the successive searches were constitutionally unreasonable.247  The trial 
court granted Nguyen’s motion to suppress evidence, and the State 
appealed.248 
On appeal, the State argued that the trial court erred in granting 
Nguyen’s motion because the use of a drug-sniffing dog in the common 
hallway of a secured apartment building did not constitute an illegal search 
under either the federal or state constitutions.249  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court began by reviewing the standard of review concerning a 
trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress.250  The court 
“affirm[s] a district court decision regarding a motion to suppress if there is 
sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the district 
court’s findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of 
the evidence.”251  Violations of constitutional rights are reviewed de 
novo.252 
The court began its analysis by quoting the Fourth Amendment: “The 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to 
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article [I], Section 8 of the 
North Dakota Constitution, prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.”253 
These rights are not only viewed as property rights, but also as a protection 
of “individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion” but 
they “cannot be translated into a general constitutional ‘right to 
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privacy.’”254  This means that in order for there to be a violation, there must 
be an intrusion into the person’s expectation of privacy.255  The court stated 
that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy has two requirements: 
“[F]irst that a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”256  Therefore, if a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a certain area, the “government must obtain a 
warrant prior to conducting a search unless an exception to the warrant 
requirement applies.”257 
In determining whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists, there 
must be a showing that there was both a subjective expectation of privacy 
and that the expectation is objectively reasonable.258  There are several 
factors in this determination, including: whether there is a possessory 
interest in the things seized or the place searched, whether the party can 
exclude others, whether the party took precautions to maintain privacy, and 
whether the party had a key to the premises.259  The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has regularly held that tenants of multifamily dwellings do not 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in common or shared areas.260 
Other circuits agree with this stance.261 
In this case, the court reasoned that the locked and secured entrance to 
Nguyen’s apartment was designed to provide security for the tenants rather 
than to provide privacy in the common hallway.262  The court further 
articulated that “[a]n expectation of privacy necessarily implies an 
expectation that one will be free of any intrusion, not merely unwarranted 
intrusions.”263  Here, the common hallways in Nguyen’s apartment building 
were available for use by tenants as well as their guests, the landlord and his 
agents, and others that had legitimate reasons to be there.264  Nguyen could 
not bar entry, nor could he exclude others from the common hallway.265 
Even though the law enforcement agents were technical trespassers in the 
common hallways, it was of no consequence because there was no 
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reasonable expectation of privacy by Nguyen that the hallway would be free 
from any intrusion.266  Therefore, the entry by law enforcement into the 
common hallway was not a search.267 
The court went on further to reason that “no legitimate expectation of 
privacy is violated by governmental conduct that can reveal only 
information about contraband and nothing about arguably ‘private’ 
facts.”268  Here, there was no legitimate interest in privately possessing 
marijuana, and the probability that the “use of a drug-sniffing dog in the 
common hallway of a secure apartment building will actually compromise 
any legitimate interest in privacy is too remote to characterize the use of the 
drug-sniffing dog as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.”269 
Nguyen used Florida v. Jardines270 to argue the use of the drug-
sniffing dog was a search.271  In Jardines, the United States Supreme Court 
determined “officer use of a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch 
(curtilage) to investigate the contents of the home did constitute a ‘search’ 
under the Fourth Amendment.”272  The Fourth Amendment protects 
curtilage of a house.273  To determine the extent of curtilage, one looks at 
“whether the area harbors . . . intimate activity associated with the sanctity 
of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”274  The United States Supreme 
Court articulated four factors in determining curtilage: 
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, 
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the 
home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps 
taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by 
people passing by.275 
The court determined that, unlike the curtilage of a home, a party does 
not have a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the common hallways and 
shared spaces of an apartment building.”276  The court concluded that 
because the common hallway was not an area within the curtilage of 
Nguyen’s apartment, no expectation of privacy existed.277  Under these 
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CRIMINAL LAW – HOMICIDE – EVIDENCE OF RELATIONSHIP OF 
DEFENDANT AND WIFE 
State v. Kalmio 
 
In State v. Kalmio,279 Omar Mohamed Kalmio appealed from a 
judgment of conviction for four counts of class AA felony murder after a 
jury trial.280  The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of 
the district court.281  Kalmio was charged with the murders of Sabrina 
Zephier, Jolene Zephier, Dillon Zephier, and Jeremy Longie, all of which 
occurred on January 28, 2011.282  The five-month-old daughter of Sabrina 
Zephier and Kalmio was found unharmed at the scene of Sabrina’s 
murder.283  Sabrina’s mother Jolene, brother Dillon, and Jolene’s boyfriend 
Jeremy Longie were found dead in their home.284  The same firearm, which 
was never located, killed all four people.285 
The district court held a hearing on the State’s motion in limine to 
allow hearsay evidence of various witnesses regarding Kalimo’s prior bad 
acts.286  The district court made preliminary rulings on admissibility 
regarding each witness’s testimony: depending on how the testimony was 
presented at trial, these rulings were subject to change.287 
At trial, testimony showed that Kalmio worked near Williston and was 
at an oil rig site during the time of the murders.288  However, the State 
presented contradictory witness testimony, which stated that Kalmio and his 
brother were seen leaving the rig site in a white company truck during the 
same time frame.289  Other State testimony also showed that a white pickup 
was observed near Sabrina’s apartment on the night of the murders.290  The 
State also elicited a great deal of testimony on Sabrina and Kalmio’s 
tumultuous relationship and disagreements over various parenting 
decisions.291  Evidence demonstrated that Kalmio and Jolene Zephier had 
disagreed over Jolene’s claiming of Sabrina and Kalmio’s child on her tax 
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return in order to obtain a refund.292  In addition, evidence established that 
the same weapon was used in each killing, and Kalmio had previously 
sought information on how to obtain a firearm.293 
Kalmio requested an alibi instruction, but did not submit a notice of 
alibi as required by North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1.294  The 
district court denied Kalmio’s request for an alibi instruction.295  Kalmio 
objected to the State’s use of a PowerPoint in closing argument, which 
contained images of a gun and red circles, which Kalmio claimed looked 
like blood.296  The district court denied Kalmio’s request for a mistrial, but 
directed the images to be removed and the jury to disregard the images.297 
The jury found Kalmio guilty on all four counts of murder and Kalmio was 
sentenced to four consecutive life sentences without the possibility of 
parole.298 
Kalmio’s main argument on appeal was that the district court abused its 
discretion by allowing hearsay testimony and testimony concerning his 
prior bad acts.299  The North Dakota Supreme Court began by stating that 
the decision of the district court determining whether to admit or exclude 
evidence will only be reversed on appeal for abuse of discretion.300  The 
court explained that “[a] district court abuses its discretion in evidentiary 
rulings when it acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably, or when it 
misinterprets or misapplies the law.”301  The court concluded that Kalmio 
had preserved the hearsay issues for appeal by objecting consistently to the 
testimony and by the district court granting a standing objection.302 
After concluding the issues had been preserved for appeal, the court 
stated that the key issue was “whether the district court abused its discretion 
in allowing hearsay testimony and in performing its relevancy analysis.”303 
The court cited North Dakota Rule of Evidence 801(c), which states 
“‘[h]earsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted.”304  The court explained that hearsay is generally 
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inadmissible without an exception and that North Dakota Rule of Evidence 
803(3) provides the exception relied upon by the district court.305 
Rule 803(3) provides an exception for “[a] statement of the declarant’s 
then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition . . . 
but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact 
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, 
identification, or terms of the declarant’s will.”306  Statements must be 
contemporaneous with the state of mind the parties seeks to prove, there 
cannot be any circumstances suggesting an ulterior motive to misrepresent 
his or her state of mind, and the state of mind of the declarant must be 
relevant to an issue in the case.307  In addition, the court explained that 
statements cannot be offered as proof of the underlying facts, but only to 
show the declarant’s actual state of mind.308 
The court also stated that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the admission of 
testimonial hearsay against the accused in a criminal case, unless the 
witness is unavailable to testify and the accused has had a prior opportunity 
to cross-examine the declarant.309  The court made clear that the 
Confrontation Clause does not apply to non-testimonial hearsay, but the 
United States Supreme Court has not provided a definition for what is 
testimonial.310 
The court then addressed the admissibility of the testimony of each 
witness whose testimony was addressed at the motion in limine hearings 
and who testified at the trial.311  The first witness was Kari Salmon, who 
testified about Sabrina Zephier’s overall physical condition, an injury to 
Sabrina’s eye, and Ms. Salmon’s referral of Sabrina to the Domestic Abuse 
Crisis Center.312  The court concluded that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting this testimony.313 
Next, the court considered the testimony of Ashley Counts, an 
employee of the Domestic Violence Crisis Center, who testified that 
Sabrina had expressed fear of Kalmio and testified that Sabrina’s physical 
condition indicated she had been abused.314  Kalmio argued that the district 
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court erred in following the Schumacker test delineated by the court in this 
criminal case and that the court should have applied the rule from 
Bernhardt v. State.315  The court rejected the Bernhardt test, but decided to 
clarify the state of mind exception.316 
In Schumacker, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that the 
declarant’s state of mind must be relevant to an issue in the case in order to 
be admissible.317  Kalmio argued that this formulation is too broad and 
North Dakota should follow Minnesota’s Bernhardt test, which limits the 
use of this exception to where “the victim’s state of mind is a relevant issue 
and notes those cases generally arise when ‘the defendant raises the defense 
of accident, suicide, or self-defense.’”318  The court rejected this test and 
explained that even when the victim’s state of mind is not an element of the 
crime, cause of action, or defense, it may still be relevant to other factual 
issues such as the motive or intent of the defendant.319  The court required a 
case-specific analysis of whichever ultimate fact the evidence regarding the 
victim’s state of mind is offered to support.320  The court found that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Ashley Counts’s 
testimony because the evidence of Sabrina’s fear and physical condition 
were relevant to Kalmio’s motive.321  The court found it relevant that 
Sabrina and Jolene Zephier were afraid and that Kalmio knew of their fear 
and the possible consequences for him if their fears were reported to 
Kalmio’s parole officer or law enforcement.322 
The court next decided that Terri Zephier’s testimony about her sister 
Sabrina’s indicated fear of Kalmio, the beatings Sabrina received from 
Kalmio, as well as statements detailing Sabrina’s swollen face and body 
covered in belt marks, were at least minimally relevant to show motive or 
intent.323  Subsequently, the court found Rochelle Greger’s testimony, 
including statements regarding several altercations Sabrina had with 
Kalmio and Sabrina’s desire to move to a safer building, was at least 
minimally relevant to the issue of Kalmio’s motive or intent, and such 
statements were thusly admissible.324  The court found similar statements of 
Joyce Tacan, Amy Dauphinais, Gloria Carbajal, and Elizabeth Lambert 
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were all admissible because they showed Sabrina Zephier’s and Jolene 
Zephier’s states of mind and were at least minimally relevant to Kalmio’s 
motive or intent.325 
The court next addressed Kalmio’s argument that the district court 
abused its discretion in refusing to give an alibi jury instruction.326  The 
court stated that North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 12.1(a) 
requires a defendant to “serve written notice on the prosecuting attorney of 
any intended alibi defense and file the notice within the time provided for 
making pretrial motions.”327  Kalmio failed to raise his alibi defense as 
required by Rule 12.1, and therefore, the court did not find the district court 
abused its discretion when it rejected Kalmio’s alibi defense request.328 
Kalmio also argued that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct 
and inflamed the jury by showing a PowerPoint with images of a firearm 
and red dots resembling blood during closing arguments.329  The court 
stated the test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether “the conduct, in the 
context of the entire trial, was sufficiently prejudicial to violate a 
defendant’s due process rights.”330  The court reviewed the issue de novo 
and concluded that, even assuming there was misconduct, the misconduct 
was not sufficiently prejudicial to violate Kalmio’s due process rights 
because the court ordered the images to be removed and instructed the jury 
to disregard the images.331 
Finally, the court reviewed Kalmio’s claim that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction.332  Kalmio argued that the evidence 
was largely circumstantial and thusly was insufficient to support his 
conviction.333  Review of sufficiency of the evidence is limited to the court 
reviewing “the record to determine if there is competent evidence allowing 
the jury to draw an inference reasonably tending to prove guilt and fairly 
warranting a conviction.”334  The court concluded that there was ample 
evidence to allow a jury to reasonably infer that Kalmio was guilty.335  As 
 
325.  Id. ¶¶ 28-38, 846 N.W.2d at 762-65. 
326.  Id. ¶ 39, 846 N.W.2d at 765. 
327.  Id. ¶ 40.  
328.  Id. ¶ 43, 846 N.W.2d at 766.  
329.  Id. ¶ 44.  
330.  Id. ¶ 45.  
331.  Id. ¶ 47, 846 N.W.2d at 767.  
332.  Id. ¶ 48. 
333.  Id. ¶ 50. 
334.  Id. ¶ 49. 
335.  Id. ¶¶ 50-51, 846 N.W.2d at 767-68. 
          
668 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:637 
such, the court affirmed the conviction.336  Chief Justice VandeWalle and 
Justice Sandstrom concurred.337 
Justice Kapsner dissented from parts II, V, and VI of the majority 
opinion.338 Justice Kapsner conducted a detailed review of the hearsay 
statements admitted under the state of mind exception and concluded that 
the evidence was inadmissible because the declarant’s state of mind was not 
relevant to an issue in the case.339  Justice Kapsner stated that the district 
court admitted the evidence because it believed the evidence was relevant to 
show why the victims “did what they did before their deaths,” but Justice 
Kapsner noted that only Kalmio’s actions, intentions, and purpose were 
relevant.340  Justice Kapsner also took issue with the majority opinion’s 
suggestion that the victim’s fear was relevant to show Kalmio’s motive to 
murder them.341  Justice Kapsner pointed out that not once during the 
course of the trial did the State argue or the district court find that the 
victim’s fear was relevant to Kalmio’s alleged motive.342  Justice Kapsner 
concluded “without some basis for the theory that Kalmio killed Sabrina 
and Jolene Zephier because of their fear, the witnesses’ statement about 
Sabrina and Jolene’s fear are not relevant to an issue in this case.”343 
Furthermore, Justice Kapsner noted that several of the witnesses’ testimony, 
concerning past physical and verbal altercations between the witnesses and 
Kalmio, exceeded the scope of the state of mind exception and the district 
court erroneously admitted them.344  Finally, Justice Kapsner stated that, 
even if the evidence was properly admitted under the state of mind 
exception to the rule against hearsay, the district court should have 
evaluated the evidence under the “unfairly prejudicial” criteria stated in 
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CRIMINAL LAW – SEARCHES AND SEIZURES – LACK OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
State v. Hart 
 
In State v. Hart,346 Alicia Hart appealed her conviction of possession of 
drug paraphernalia, which was entered after her conditional guilty plea that 
reserved her right to appeal her denied motion to suppress.347  The second 
defendant, Paul Sitte, also appealed from a criminal judgment resulting 
from his conditional guilty plea for the possession of methamphetamine 
drug paraphernalia and possession of marijuana drug paraphernalia.348  The 
parties consolidated the appeal because it arose out of the same facts.349 
In August 2012, police received an anonymous tip that two individuals, 
Chad Grubb and his girlfriend, were selling methamphetamine from a 
particular residence in Bismarck.350  The Burleigh County Sheriff’s 
department had a bench warrant for Grubb for misdemeanor driving 
charges.351  Deputies arrived at the residence indicated in the tip to serve the 
bench warrant on Grubb.352  The residence was a duplex, horizontally split 
into separate upstairs and downstairs units.353  Officers made contact with 
other tenants of the duplex who stated Grubb was not currently home, but 
such persons gave the officers permission to search.354  During the search, 
the officers located a locked gun safe in a common area laundry room that 
contained what appeared to be a large amount of methamphetamine and a 
semiautomatic handgun.355 
Officers then questioned the other occupants and learned Grubb was 
there previously in the day but left with Paul Sitte in a red pickup “after 
grabbing some of his stuff from there.”356  Officers then drove to Sitte’s 
residence, where an officer was able to see a red pickup and two males in 
the driveway.357  Based on the warrant photo alone, the officer was unable 
to identify Grubb.358  However, the officer saw the two males “take 
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something out of the vehicles and carry it into the residence.  And not come 
back out.”359 
Backup arrived on the scene as the officers served the bench 
warrant.360  Officers knocked on the door, and eventually Grubb answered 
the door, identified himself, and was arrested without resistance in the 
“foyer.”361  The district court found that the officer “chose to enter the Sitte 
house to place Grubb under arrest instead of asking Grubb to exit the house 
and arrest him in the garage.”362 
Because the officers knew there was another individual in the house, 
they began to ask whoever was inside to come out.363  The officers feared 
for their safety due to the “large amount of methamphetamine and two 
handguns” that were found at the other duplex.364  After arresting Grubb, 
they conducted a protective sweep of the Sitte residence and arrested Sitte 
and his girlfriend Hart.365  Sitte appeared to be under the influence and was 
arrested in the vicinity of drug paraphernalia, which included a little baggy 
with residue, razor blades, and pieces of tin foil.366  Hart was arrested in a 
locked basement room with drug paraphernalia in her purse.367  After the 
officers cleared the house, the officers obtained a search warrant and found 
additional paraphernalia and drugs.368 
Sitte and Hart each filed a motion to suppress all the evidence seized 
from the Sitte residence, arguing the seizure violated their Fourth 
Amendment rights.369  The State argued that the protective sweep was 
permissible due to exigent circumstances, which would render the 
discovered evidence admissible.370  The district court denied the motions to 
suppress, and the defendants appealed.371 
In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court will affirm a district court decision after finding “sufficient 
competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the district court’s findings 
exists and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the 
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evidence.”372  Sitte and Hart argued there was no probable cause or exigent 
circumstance justifying the protective sweep.373 
In its analysis, the court reiterated the Fourth Amendment protections 
of the “right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”374  A search occurs when officers intrude upon an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.375  The Fourth Amendment 
primarily concerns an intrusion into an individual’s home, and warrantless 
and non-consensual searches and seizures within a home are presumptively 
unreasonable.376 
The exigent circumstances exception is one exception to this general 
prohibition.377  The North Dakota Supreme Court has defined an exigent 
circumstance as “an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent 
imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the 
imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.”378  The court, 
quoting United States Supreme Court precedent, also stated a hesitation in 
finding an exigent circumstance exists where the “underlying offense for 
which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor.”379  The burden 
of showing the presence of an exigent circumstance is on the government, 
and the North Dakota Supreme Court applies a de novo standard of review 
in determining if the facts constitute an exigent circumstance.380 
In this case, Hart and Sitte had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their home, and the officers conducted a warrantless search because the 
officers “entered an open vehicle-garage door, passed through [Sitte’s] 
garage, and entered into his home without consent to execute a routine 
misdemeanor bench warrant.”381  The State argued it was an appropriate 
“protective sweep” because the sweep occurred incident to Grubb’s arrest 
and was based on a reasonable and articulable concern for officer safety.382 
The court proceeded to discuss a United States Supreme Court case 
regarding this issue, Maryland v. Buie.383  Based upon Buie, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court stated that the issue is “whether officers possessed a 
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‘reasonable belief’ based on ‘specific and articulable facts,’ which taken 
together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, reasonably 
warranted the officer in believing ‘that the area swept harbored an 
individual posing a danger to the officer or others.’”384 
The court then discussed two separate North Dakota Supreme Court 
cases, State v. Gagnon385 and State v. Mitzel.386  In Gagnon, the majority 
held that a warrantless police “walk through” of a residence was an 
unreasonable search because there was neither the possibility of 
“destruction of evidence or the need to protect officer safety.”387  In Mitzel, 
the court held, “[b]ecause the facts did not show an emergency requiring 
swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or property,” there was no 
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.388 
Here, the State made several arguments justifying the protective sweep 
including: the officers uncovered large amounts of methamphetamine and 
two weapons, the officers knew suspect Grubb had taken off with “stuff,” 
one officer observed two unidentified men going into the residence and 
“taking something out of the vehicle and carry[ing] it with them,” and the 
concern over the amount of time it took someone to answer the door.389  
The State contended that altogether these facts gave the officers a 
reasonable belief that a protective sweep was necessary to find an 
individual posing.390 
The court disagreed with the State’s argument.391  The court concluded 
the officers were not justified because it was clear that the decision to enter 
the Sitte residence was effected by their previous discovery of weapons and 
methamphetamine, which could not be accurately linked to suspect 
Grubb.392  The evidence found at the duplex did not reveal any “concrete, 
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from 
those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the 
area to be swept harbored an individual posing a danger . . . .”393 
The court also looked at other factors indicating the officer’s sweep 
was unjustified, as there was not “an emergency situation requiring swift 
action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property . . . 
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.”394  These factors included: the catalyst of the warrant came from an 
anonymous tip that was on the low end of reliability, the officers had no 
information that Grubb was dangerous or had violent tendencies because 
Grubb was being arrested on non-violent misdemeanor crimes, the officers 
were unable to identify Grubb or Sitte as either of the two males in the 
driveway, and the officers were unable to identify what they had carried 
into the house.395  The court also noted that Grubb eventually identified 
himself and was arrested without incident, such that the officers could have 
simply escorted Grubb out through the garage and left the premises.396 
Finally, the court felt that expanding the protective sweep doctrine to these 
facts would “go beyond the holding of Buie, and encroach upon the 
constitutional right of the people to be secure in their homes.”397  Based 
upon these considerations, the court unanimously reserved the judgments 
against Hart and Sitte and remanded the cases for further proceedings 
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CRIMINAL LAW – SEARCHES AND SEIZURES – NIGHT SERVICE 
OF SEARCH WARRANT 
State v. Zeller 
 
In State v. Zeller,399 Todd Zeller appealed his judgment of conviction, 
which was obtained after he conditionally pled guilty to possession of 
methamphetamine and marijuana, both with intent to manufacture or 
deliver.400  The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the underlying 
search warrant was not supported by probable cause and reversed the 
judgment and remanded the case.401 
Early in the morning on November 17, 2012, Detective Witte of the 
Fargo Police Department applied for a warrant to search Zeller’s home.402 
Detective Witte’s presented a supporting affidavit, which alleged Zeller was 
involved in drug trafficking.403  Specifically, the affidavit claimed that 
Detective Witte had been informed in 2010 that Zeller was distributing 
methamphetamine in Fargo and that in July 2012 Detective Witte had 
received several complaints through the narcotics tip line alleging “a high 
volume of short stay, come and go traffic, particularly on the weekend, and 
that many of the vehicles displayed out-of-state license plates.”404  The 
affidavit further stated that two of the license plates seen at Zeller’s home 
belonged to individuals known to Detective Witte to be methamphetamine 
users.405 
In addition, the affidavit reported a controlled buy of 
methamphetamine from John Gust in the vicinity of Zeller’s residence.406  
A confidential informant performed the controlled buy using recorded 
funds.407  Mr. Gust told the confidential informant that he was going to 
meet his “dealer” to get more methamphetamine.408  Within a short time, a 
police detective observed Gust in the alley immediately behind Zeller’s 
residence.409 Police tested the substance purchased by the confidential 
informant from Gust and confirmed it was methamphetamine.410  Officers 
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then arrested Gust for delivery of methamphetamine and searched Gust’s 
phone, which led to discovery of a message from “Todd Z” asking if Gust 
was “close to the area.”411  The message was confirmed to have come from 
a number belonging to Zeller.412 
The magistrate authorized a search of Zeller’s home at 3:25 a.m. and 
issued a warrant that included a nighttime search provision.413  Police 
executed the warrant around 4:00 a.m. and discovered narcotics and 
paraphernalia.414  Zeller was arrested and charged with nine felonies.415 
Zeller moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the search 
warrant itself and the nighttime provision in the warrant were not supported 
by probable cause.416  The district court denied Zeller’s motion to 
suppress.417 
Zeller again moved to dismiss, this time on the grounds that Detective 
Witte had misled the magistrate to obtain the search warrant.418  Zeller 
requested a Franks hearing to evaluate whether the search warrant was 
issued based upon false statements of Detective Witte.419  The district court, 
after a hearing, denied the motion, and Zeller entered a conditional guilty 
plea while reserving the right to appellate review of the court’s ruling on his 
motions to suppress.420 
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by stating it would 
“affirm a district court’s order denying a motion to suppress evidence if 
there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the 
court’s findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of 
the evidence.”421  The court explained that questions of law are fully 
reviewable on appeal, including questions of whether a finding of fact 
meets a legal standard.422  The court also stated that whether there was 
sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant is a fully reviewable 
question of law.423  The court stated it would “generally defer to a 
magistrate’s determination of probable cause if there was a substantial basis 
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for the conclusion, and doubtful or marginal cases should be resolved in 
favor of the magistrate’s determination.”424 
After explaining the general standard of review for probable cause 
determinations, the court made clear that the key issue in this case was 
nighttime search provisions.425  A nighttime search is one that does not 
occur between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. local time.426  The 
court explained that if a warrant applicant requests authorization to perform 
a nighttime search, then a second showing of probable cause is required.427 
In order for probable cause to exist for a nighttime search, a showing must 
be made that the evidence sought can be quickly and easily disposed of if 
the warrant is not promptly executed.428  Allegations about the mere 
existence of evidence is not sufficient; rather, an officer must set forth some 
facts suggesting the evidence will actually be destroyed without a nighttime 
search.429 
The court concluded that the district court had erred in its 
determination that probable cause existed to support the approval of a 
nighttime search.430  In arriving at this conclusion, the court stated that there 
was no support in the record, aside from one controlled buy, to indicate that 
without a nighttime search the evidence would be destroyed or removed 
from Zeller’s home before a search could be executed.431 
In State v. Roth,432 the North Dakota Supreme Court had concluded 
that a search warrant affidavit averring that the house in question had 
methamphetamine manufacturing occurring in the basement during the late 
night hours, that police observations detailed late night activities in the 
house, and that at least one person who was connected with drug activity 
was in the house at the time was sufficient to establish probable cause for a 
nighttime search provision.433  But the court in Roth made clear that 
particularized facts, and not general averments, were required to meet the 
probable cause standard.434 
The court found that, unlike Roth, the averments here were of a 
generalized nature and were insufficient to establish probable cause for a 
 
424.  Id. (quoting Roth v. State, 2007 ND 112, ¶ 18, 735 N.W.2d 882, 890). 
425.  Id. ¶¶ 9-10, 845 N.W.2d at 10. 
426.  Id. ¶ 10. 
427.  Id.  
428.  Id. ¶ 11. 
429.  Id.  
430.  Id. ¶ 14, 845 N.W.2d at 11.  
431.  Id. 
432.  2007 ND 112, 735 N.W.2d 882. 
433.  Zeller, ¶ 16, 845 N.W.2d at 12. 
434.  Id. 
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nighttime search provision.435  Detective Witte had admitted he had no 
information showing exigent circumstances or that Zeller would destroy 
evidence.436  The court found there was no indication that the drugs or 
money would be gone if the officers waited until 6:00 a.m. to execute the 
search warrant and no evidence that the controlled buy was part of an 
ongoing operation of trafficking conducted during the nighttime.437  Finally, 
the court found that the affidavit did not reflect any risk to officer safety 
that would justify a nighttime entry provision.438  The court reversed the 
conviction and remanded with instructions to allow Zeller to withdraw his 
guilty pleas and to suppress any evidence obtained during the nighttime 
search.439 
Justice Sandstrom dissented.440  Justice Sandstrom was concerned that 
the court has been improperly equating nighttime searches to no-knock 
search warrants in drug cases.441  Justice Sandstrom pointed out that the 
United States Supreme Court has made clear that no special showing is 
constitutionally required for a nighttime search other than a showing that 
the contraband is likely to be on the property or person to be searched at the 
time.442  In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that 
no-knock entries are permissible only if the police have reasonable 
suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence would be dangerous 
or futile given the circumstances, or would inhibit the effective execution of 
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439.  Id. ¶ 21. 
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DOMESTIC LAW – CHILD CUSTODY – GRANDPARENTS 
VISITATION RIGHTS – PARENTS RIGHT TO REAR CHILDREN 
In re S.B. 
 
In re S.B.,444 the North Dakota Supreme Court considered an appeal 
from a district court order awarding grandparent visitation.  In the district 
court, the paternal grandparents of three children sought a court ordered 
visitation schedule.445  During the evidentiary hearing in the district court, 
the grandparents advocated for visitation because of the value the children 
would receive from growing up with grandparents in their lives.446  The 
grandparents also noted that they already had a close relationship with the 
children.447  The grandmother testified that the parents stopped letting them 
see the children after the grandmother reported the parents to the police.448 
The grandmother denied this accusation and another accusation that she 
made negative comments in front of the children.449 
The parents offered testimony that there had been “negative situations” 
and an ongoing tension between the parents and grandparents.450  The father 
of the children also testified that the grandparents did not honor the parents’ 
authority with the children.451  The father also disputed the contention that 
the grandparents maintained a close relationship with the two youngest 
children.452  Despite this, the parents were open to resolving the issues to 
allow the grandparents to see the children on a visitation schedule.453  After 
the district court ordered visitation, and later modified the schedule, the 
parents appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.454 
The parents contend that the district court erred in ordering visitation 
for the grandparents because the grandparent visitation statute is 
unconstitutional.455  The parents argued that the statute interfered with the 
parents’ fundamental right to rear their children.456  In 1993, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a prior grandparent 
 
444.  2014 ND 87, 845 N.W.2d 317. 
445.  Id. ¶ 2, 845 N.W.2d at 318. 
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visitation statute.457  The court decided in Berg that the State did not have a 
compelling interest in presuming visitation rights to grandparents.458 
Shortly after this decision, the United States Supreme Court similarly struck 
down a Washington statute of third-party visitation because it did not 
provide any weight towards the parents’ determinations regarding their 
children’s best interests.459  The North Dakota Legislature responded to 
these decisions by amending the grandparent visitation statute.460  As a 
result of this statute, a parents’ decision regarding grandparent visitation is 
presumed to be in the child’s best interests, and grandparents have the 
burden to overcome this presumption by proving that visitation is in the 
best interests of the child.461  Before this case, the court had never 
considered the constitutionality of this amended statute.462 
In deciding on the statute’s constitutionality, the court deferred to the 
statutes construction and context for statutory interpretation.463  Pursuant to 
the avoidance doctrine of statutory construction, if there are two possible 
constructions of a statute, one of which invalidates a statute and one of 
which does not, the court must construe the statute so as to avoid 
constitutional invalidity.464  The court then referred to the legislative history 
in a committee report, which emphasized the legislative concern that the 
statute be constitutionally valid.465  Looking to the statute, the court could 
not find any presumption of favor or burden of proof, nor procedural 
requirements.466  Accordingly, the implicated visitation statue was 
dissimilar than those invalidated in Berg and Troxel, such that the amended 
visitation statute passed constitutional muster.467 
After the court decided that the grandparent visitation statute was 
constitutional, it then reviewed if the visitation order was in the best 
interests of the child.468  The parents contend that the grandparent visitation 
was not in the best interests of the children because it interfered with the 
parent-child relationship.469  Even with the testimony from the father about 
the negative situations and lack of relationship with some of the children, 
 
457.  Id. ¶ 12, 845 N.W.2d at 320 (citing Hoff v. Berg, 1999 ND 115, 595 N.W.2d 285). 
458.  Id. ¶ 21, 845 N.W.2d at 323 (citing Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285). 
459.  Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 845 N.W.2d at 320-21 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)). 
460.  Id. ¶ 15, 845 N.W.2d at 321. 
461.  Id. ¶ 22, 845 N.W.2d at 323. 
462.  Id. ¶ 16, 845 N.W.2d at 321. 
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464.  Id. 
465.  Id. ¶¶19-20, 845 N.W.2d at 321-22. 
466.  Id. ¶ 18, 845 N.W.2d at 322. 
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the district court determined that the visitation was not detrimental to the 
children470 and the district court did not presume the parents’ acted in the 
best interests of the child.471 The North Dakota Supreme Court found that 
the district court erred by not giving any favorable presumption to the 
parents’ decision.472  The court reversed and remanded the district court’s 
award of grandparental visitation because the grandparent visitation statute 
requires deference for fit parents’ judgment as to the best interests of the 
child.473 
The court did not review the third issue of whether the district court 
awarded too much visitation.474  However, it did offer guidance to the 
district court on remand.475  The grandparents were awarded visitation that 
was similar to a non-custodial parent.476  The court warned that if the 
grandparents were to be given visitation upon remand, it should “not be so 
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INDIANS – INDIAN RESERVATION INVOLVING NON-INDIAN 
PARTY – CHILD SUPPORT – SUPPORT OF CHILDREN 
State v. B.B. 
 
In State v. B.B.,478 the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that 
the state court had jurisdiction and did not infringe upon the right of the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe to self-govern when it ordered B.B., the father 
of the child J.Z.T., to repay state support paid to the guardian of the child 
and to pay for future child support.479  The child in this case was born and 
conceived off of the reservation.480  Although the mother, child, and 
grandmother are enrolled members of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, the 
father is not an enrolled member.481  The Standing Rock Sioux tribal court 
awarded custody of J.Z.T. to the maternal grandmother.482  In 2012, the 
State of North Dakota sued B.B. seeking to adjudicate paternity, an “award 
of future child support,” and an order requiring B.B. to reimburse the State 
for assistance provided to the grandmother of the child.483  The state district 
court found that it had jurisdiction to “decide paternity and support” and the 
tribal court retained jurisdiction with regard to “the issue of residential 
responsibility and parenting time.”484 
At issue before the North Dakota Supreme Court was whether the state 
court did, in fact, have jurisdiction to decide paternity and support.485  B.B. 
argued that the state court did not have jurisdiction because the child 
custody proceeding was started in the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court 
and because the grandmother and child are enrolled members.486  The court 
first addressed its standard of review by explaining that when the 
jurisdictional facts are in dispute, questions of law are subjected to the de 
novo standard of review and questions of fact are subject to the clearly 
erroneous standard of review.487  Because the facts were uncontested by 
B.B. and were supported by evidence at trial, the facts were not clearly 
erroneous.488 
 
478.  2013 ND 242, 840 N.W.2d 651. 
479.  Id. ¶ 1, 840 N.W.2d at 652. 
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484.  Id. 
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Although there are some cases where respecting the tribe’s right of 
self-governances deprives the state court of subject matter jurisdiction, the 
court explained that this case is not one of those occasions.489  Some 
situations where the state would not have subject matter jurisdiction occur 
where all the parties are members of the tribe and the “conduct giving rise 
to the action occurred on the reservation.”490  On the other hand, the State 
would usually have jurisdiction if the conduct occurred outside of Indian 
country or, “even when a claim arises in Indian country,” the state will have 
jurisdiction if the “claim is brought against a non-Indian.”491 
The court noted that neither B.B. nor the State were members of the 
tribe.492  Furthermore, none of the conduct relevant to this case occurred on 
the lands belonging to the Tribe.493  This case did not impact the tribe’s 
right to self-government, and, as a result, the court concluded, as a matter of 
law, that “the tribal court does not have exclusive subject matter 
jurisdiction” over the paternity and support action.494  The court further 
concluded that the paternity and support claim in this case could be 
bifurcated from the custody action that the Standing Rock Sioux tribal court 
brought.495  Therefore, in this case, the state court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over the paternity and support action.496  Accordingly, the court 
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JUDGES – REMOVAL OR DISCIPLINE – INVESTIGATION OF 
JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT 
In re Disciplinary Action Against Corwin 
 
In re Disciplinary Action Against Corwin498 involved a disciplinary 
proceeding, where the North Dakota Supreme Court found that Wickham 
Corwin, judge of the district court for the East Central Judicial District, 
violated N.D. Code Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C)(1) and Canon 3(C)(2), 
holding that whether a judge’s conduct constituted sexual harassment as 
defined under federal or state laws is not a relevant inquiry to finding a 
violation of the preceding rules of judicial conduct.499  This case arose from 
a formal disciplinary proceeding initiated in February 2013.500 Disciplinary 
counsel commenced the action because of inappropriate conduct 
perpetuated by Judge Corwin that began in 2010 and was directed towards a 
female court reporter assigned to work with him.501  Judge Corwin had 
engaged in a “pattern of misconduct” that lasted for an eighteen month 
period and resulted in negative mental and physical effects on the court 
reporter.502  The behavior in question included several unsolicited advances 
on the part of Judge Corwin to not only try to get the court reporter alone 
with him but also to promote and push a more intimate relationship.503  
When the Judge’s conduct was repeatedly rebuffed, Judge Corwin gave the 
court reporter negative performance reviews.504 Eventually, Judge Corwin, 
of his own volition, disclosed the events that transpired between him and 
the court reporter, announced that he would not seek reelection, and 
cooperated with disciplinary proceedings.505 
Judge Corwin argued that the Judicial Conduct Commission erred in 
finding that he violated the North Dakota Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 
3(C)(2), which provided that “[a] judge shall not, in the performance of 
administrative duties, engage in speech, gestures, or other conduct that 
could reasonably be perceived as sexual harassment and must require the 
same standard of conduct of others subject to the judge’s direction and 
control.”506  According to Judge Corwin, he believed that “federal and state 
laws should govern any assessment of the evidence” in the case and that the 
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Commission erred in not allowing him to present expert testimony on the 
law regarding sexual harassment.507  The court, however, rejected Judge 
Corwin’s argument for several reasons including: (1) that North Dakota 
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C)(2) “does not require the 
establishment of sexual harassment under federal or state law to constitute a 
violation of its provisions” as judicial disciplinary provisions are not civil or 
criminal in nature, (2) the standard for finding a violation of Canon 3(C)(2) 
is merely finding “conduct that could be reasonably perceived as sexual 
harassment,” and (3) the issue before the hearing panel was only whether 
there was a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, not whether there 
was sexual harassment as defined by state or federal law.508 
Although a finding of sexual harassment is not required to find a 
violation of North Dakota Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C)(2), the 
Unified Judicial System Policy 119, which defines harassment, would be 
enough to inform Judge Corwin of what kind of conduct could be 
reasonably “perceived as sexual harassment.”509  Furthermore, Judge 
Corwin’s conduct was such that it could “reasonably be perceived as sexual 
harassment” by the court reporter.510 
Judge Corwin also argued that there was no “clear and convincing 
evidence that he violated [North Dakota Code of Judicial] Conduct Canon 
3(C)(1).”511  However, because Judge Corwin treated the court reporter 
differently than the other members of the team as a result of a physical 
relationship between them not materializing, the court found that “there 
[was] clear and convincing evidence that Judge Corwin did not discharge 
his administrative responsibilities without bias or prejudice in violation of 
[North Dakota Code of Judicial] Conduct Canon 3(C)(1).”512  Judge Corwin 
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JUVENILE – TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS – CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS STANDARD 
In re R.L.-P. 
 
In re R.L.-P.514 was a case where the North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed a termination of parental rights because the parents were found to 
have deprived their children, which resulted in their children spending more 
than 450 out of the past 660 nights in foster care.515  After the parents’ 
divorce, the mother had primary residential responsibility of their three 
children.516 A welfare check in 2011 resulted in the mother being arrested 
for child abuse and neglect.517  During this welfare check, the mother tested 
positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, and THC.518  In addition, 
the home had broken glass, knives, and old food on the floor, an unusable 
toilet, and other miscellaneous garbage all over the home.519  The oldest 
child had missed school, which the mother claimed was the result of 
sickness, but it was apparent to the social worker that the child was not 
sick.520  The children were also very unclean and had only eaten bananas 
that day.521  As a result, the children were placed into shelter care.522 
The State petitioned to have the parental rights terminated, and a trial 
was held.523  Under North Dakota law, in order for a court to terminate 
parent rights, the court must find “‘conditions and causes of the deprivation 
are likely to continue or will not be remedied and that by reason thereof the 
child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or 
emotional harm.’”524  The judicial referee found the mother was only able 
to sustain sobriety under “very controlled circumstances” in a half-way 
house and was uncertain if she would be able to maintain this sobriety.525 
The referee found the father had mental health problems, with little 
progress made in treating these problems.526  The parents requested a 
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review by the juvenile court, which affirmed the termination findings.527  
The parents then appealed the juvenile court’s affirmation.528 
The North Dakota Supreme Court will only reverse a juvenile court 
decision if it was clearly erroneous and if it is a question of fact.529  The 
mother argued that there was a lack of clear and convincing evidence 
supporting termination under the statutory, three-part test.530  The mother 
claimed that the deprivation element of North Dakota Century Code section 
27-20-44(1) was not a result of her actions.531  For a clearly erroneous 
finding, the lower court must have had an erroneous view of the law or 
made a mistake in applying the facts to the law.532 
The court found that the mother’s continued drug use and other 
evidence in the record justified the juvenile court’s findings.533  Both the 
mother and father claimed that that there was insufficient evidence of 
continued deprivation.534  The court clarified that under North Dakota law 
there could be two separate grounds of terminating the parental rights.535 
The first stipulates that a child will be considered deprived when the child is 
in foster care for 450 out of the previous 660 nights.536  The second ground 
is finding that the deprivation would “likely continue or will not be 
remedied.”537  The juvenile court found that there was enough evidence that 
both are satisfied.538  The North Dakota Supreme Court only reviewed the 
fact that a social worker testified that the children were in foster care for 
863 days.539  Thus, the facts of the case satisfied the number of days in 
foster care requirement.540 Because this finding alone could terminate the 
parental rights, the court found it unnecessary to review whether the 
deprivation could continue.541 
Both parents contend that the State failed to reunite the children 
according to North Dakota law.542  Under North Dakota law, the State must 
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make reasonable efforts to unify the family, and the court will review the 
findings under the clearly erroneous standard.543  The father claimed that 
the social worker had no intention to reunify the children with him.544  At 
trial, the social worker stated that she could not reunify because the father 
did not have custody and the social worker only had an obligation to reunify 
the children with the mother.545  A caseworker for the family also 
recommended several things to the father on how he could see his 
children.546  One of the recommendations was supervised visits, but this 
required psychiatric evaluation and family safety orientation.547  The father 
failed to do any of the recommendations, even after having understood the 
requirements.548  The juvenile court found such actions satisfied the 
agency’s duty of due diligence to try to reunite the children with their 
father, and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.549 
The mother also contended that the State did not provide reasonable 
efforts to reunify her with her children.550  The mother claimed that she 
could not have reasonably completed all the requirements of the State and 
that she should have been given supervised parenting time after she 
completed her parenting classes.551  The court found there was enough 
evidence on the record to demonstrate that the juvenile court’s 
determination that the agency made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother 
with her children was not clearly erroneous.552  The caseworker brought the 
children to see their mother while she was incarcerated and arranged 
visitation when out of incarceration.553  When the mother was not 
considered an inmate, the mother completed a parental capacity evaluation, 
but the mother did not release the test results to social services because she 
disagreed with the testing methods.554  Also, according to her appearance 
and demeanor, the caseworker suspected the mother was using drugs 
again.555  The court recognized that the State was not required to “exhaust 
every potential solution” in regards to reunifying parents with their children 
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544.  Id. ¶ 26. 
545.  Id. ¶ 27. 
546.  Id. ¶ 30. 
547.  Id. 
548.  Id. 
549.  Id. ¶ 31, 842 N.W.2d at 896-97. 
550.  Id. ¶ 32, 842 N.W.2d at 897. 
551.  Id. 
552.  Id. ¶ 34. 
553.  Id. ¶ 33. 
554.  Id. 
555.  Id. 
          
688 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:637 
and found that reasonable efforts were made to reunify the children with 
their mother.556 
The mother also argued that the juvenile court should have applied the 
Indian Child Welfare Act to the proceeding.557  The Indian Child Welfare 
Act would have provided for a special parental termination process if the 
child was an Indian.558  The mother claimed that while the children were 
not enrolled in an Indian Tribe, they were eligible for inclusion under the 
Act under their father’s heritage.559  Such a question is one a mixed issue of 
law and fact, and the court reviews such questions of law de novo.560 
Under North Dakota law, an individual can be an Indian and not 
enrolled in a tribe.561 However, the individual must satisfy the tribe’s 
membership determinations.562  During trial, the juvenile court found that 
because the father was not enrolled in the tribe, the children were not 
eligible to enroll.563  This determination echoed the tribe’s determination 
that the children were not covered by the Indian Child Welfare Act.564  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that “‘state courts may not 
second-guess the internal decision-making processes of the tribe in regards 
to its membership determination.’”565  Based upon the foregoing 
considerations, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the order 
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TORTS – PUBLIC NUISANCES – ACTUAL INJURY FROM PUBLIC 
INJURY 
Hale v. Ward County 
 
In Hale v. Ward County,567 the North Dakota Supreme Court 
determined that the private persons in this case, the Hales, were unable to 
maintain a private nuisance claim because they failed to show that the 
public nuisance they were alleging was specially injurious to them.568  The 
Hales owned a house located on agricultural land near a law enforcement 
shooting range in Ward County.569  Other homes, farms, and County Road 
12 are also located near the shooting range.570  In a prior action, the Hales 
sued Ward County and Minot claiming that the shooting range was a 
private and public nuisance because, allegedly, the shooting range was a 
danger to their property, their neighbors’ properties, and the public using 
County Road 12.571  In this prior action, the district court granted summary 
judgment against the Hales’ claims.572  The court affirmed summary 
judgment on the private nuisance claim for a lack of evidence showing that 
a danger was posed to their property and reversed summary judgment on 
the public nuisance claims, explaining that there were “disputed issues of 
fact about the Hales’ claim that the law enforcement shooting range was a 
public nuisance for users of County Road 12.”573 
When the case was remanded, the district court decided that the Hales 
did not meet the requisite showing of a “special injury” as required by 
North Dakota Century Code section 42-01-08, and the district court 
accordingly granted summary judgment to Ward County and Minot.574  The 
Hales argued that the district court erred in the summary judgment grant for 
their public nuisance claim because sufficient evidence was proffered to 
show that Robert Hale suffered a special injury so as to raise a “genuine 
issue of material fact.”575 
In responding to the Hales allegations, the court first differentiated 
public from private nuisances.576  The court began by observing that North 
Dakota Century Code section 42-01-08 controlled this case and provides 
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that “[a] private person may maintain an action for a public nuisance if it is 
specially injurious to that person or that person’s property, but not 
otherwise.”577  The court looked to California Civil Code section 3493, the 
source code for the North Dakota statute, for guidance in construing the 
“specially injurious” phrase from North Dakota Century Code section 42-
01-08.578 
The court agreed with the district court that Susan Hale’s claim should 
be dismissed because she did not show that the shooting range was 
specially injurious to her in some way that was different than the injury to 
the public.579  The court also agreed with the district court that Robert 
Hale’s use of County Road 12 did not show that the shooting range resulted 
in a specific injury to him because he merely used the road to visit a friend 
once or twice a month.580  Thus, the injury to Robert Hale was not a special 
injury different from how it affects other members of the public.581  The 
court also concluded that the district court did not err in denying the Hales’ 
request for joinder of other neighbors to their action, for the denial of 
joinder was proper in that it “was not arbitrary, unconscionable, or 
unreasonable, was not a misapplication of law, and was the product of a 
rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination.”582  In 
conclusion, the Hales were not the “proper private person[s] to maintain a 
claim for a public nuisance for the law enforcement shooting range,” and 
the court affirmed the summary judgment, thereby dismissing the Hales’ 










577.  Id. ¶ 12. 
578.  Id. ¶ 16. 
579.  Id. ¶ 20, 848 N.W.2d at 252. 
580.  Id. ¶ 21. 
581.  Id. 
582.  Id. ¶¶ 24-26, 848 N.W.2d at 253. 
583.  Id. ¶ 23, 848 N.W.2d at 253. 
          
2014] NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 691 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW – COMPENSATION FOR 
CASUALLY CONNECTED CONDITION – FAIR HEARING – 
BURDEN OF WAGE LOSS 
Brockel v. WSI 
 
In Brockel v. WSI, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed a 
judgment that denied Rick Brockel medical benefits and terminated his 
disability benefits.584  The court affirmed in part the judgment holding that 
Brockel’s medical condition was not causally related to his workplace 
injury, reversed in part the judgment because Brockel did not have a fair 
hearing due to improper notice and an improper finding regarding failure to 
show wage loss, and remanded to reinstate retroactive benefits for further 
proceedings.585  Brockel was in a motor vehicle accident while working, 
which caused injuries to his to shoulder, spine, and ribs.586  He later 
suffered a head injury and cervical myelomalacia related to the spinal 
injury.587  He continued to suffer bouts of dizziness and light-headedness 
and was referred to Mayo Clinic.588 
Mayo Clinic found a nonunion fracture in his shoulder and a right 
vertebral artery occlusion.589  This occlusion restricted the blood flow when 
Brockel rotated his head.590  The doctor recommended surgery to the 
shoulder, but noted that such surgery would be risky due to the artery 
occlusion.591  WSI requested a determination of whether the occlusion was 
due to the motor vehicle accident, and initially the doctor stated “No” on a 
form.592 
A few months later, the Mayo doctors performed a reevaluation and 
opined that it would be reasonable to believe the accident was a “substantial 
and contributing factor.”593  WSI obtained an independent medical 
examination, which found there was not enough evidence to show that the 
accident and the occlusion were related.594  The examination also stated that 
Brockel needed the surgery in order to return to work.595  In a second 
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independent medical examination, the doctor concluded that Brockel had no 
disability from the accident, but still required activity restrictions.596  This 
doctor also concluded that Brockel would benefit from the surgery, and the 
surgery could be performed if careful consideration was given to the 
position of Brockel’s head during the surgery.597 
WSI sent Brockel a “notice of decision denying medical condition” for 
the occlusion because the ailment was unrelated to the accident.598  WSI 
also sent Brockel a “notice of intention to discontinue/reduce benefits” 
notifying him that wage loss benefits would be terminated due to the 
occlusion being his “primary disabling factor.”599  Brockel requested an 
administrative hearing with WSI.600  The administrative law judge, and later 
the district court, affirmed WSI’s decision.601 
Brockel contended that there was enough evidence to establish that his 
condition was related to his accident.602  Under North Dakota law, Brockel 
bore the burden to prove that his medical condition was causally related to 
the work injury.603  The condition does not have to be the sole cause of the 
injury, but it must be causally related.604  The court agreed with WSI that 
Brockel failed to show that the employment accident was a substantial 
contributing factor to the injury.605 
WSI based its decision primarily on the testimony of the doctor who 
performed the first independent medical examination, which found the 
occlusion was not caused by the accident.606  Specifically, WSI noted that 
there was a discrepancy between the severity of the symptoms initially 
reported by Brockel and the severity of the symptoms the independent 
doctor stated Brockel should have had if the occlusion was caused by the 
accident.607  Furthermore, the Mayo Clinic doctors did not explain this 
discrepancy.608  In conclusion, the court affirmed the district court’s 
judgment, stating the accident was not a substantial contributing factor of 
the medical condition. 
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Despite Brockel’s failure to meet his burden of proof on this issue, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that Brockel did not receive a fair 
hearing.609  Specifically, WSI failed to give Brockel proper notification to 
terminate Brockel’s disability benefits.610  Under North Dakota law, WSI 
was to give notice to Brockel and his doctor twenty-one days before 
discontinuing benefits.611  The notice must also include the reasons for 
discontinuation, Brockel’s rights to respond, and how to file the required 
report.612  The “notice of intention to discontinue/reduce benefits” did not 
fulfill this requirement because it was not sent to Brockel’s doctor and 
lacked notice of the procedures on how to file the verification.613  WSI 
asserted that Brockel waived his lack of notice by failing to raise it at the 
administrative hearing.614  The court denied this argument because Brockel 
would not have been aware that the verification of his disability would be 
the determining factor until the administrative law judge’s decision.615 
Brockel also contended that he showed his wage loss was the result of 
his injury.616  The court recognized that he carried the burden of proof in 
regards to his wage loss, concluding that WSI’s decision was “flawed in 
several respects.”617  First, the administrative law judge was focused on the 
wage loss in connection with the occlusion and not the work-related injury 
to his shoulder.618  The court cited precedent from other jurisdictions 
holding that employers will still be liable for the work-related injury despite 
an unrelated medical condition prolonging that injury.619  The court found 
Thurston v. Guys With Tools, Ltd.620 persuasive, stating “[t]o deny coverage 
to an employee in such circumstances would ‘create a windfall to 
employers simply because of the employee’s misfortune in developing an 
independent medical condition.’”621  The court then reiterated the legal 
principle that a “nonwork-related condition is not a superseding, 
intervening event that breaks the causal connection between a work-related 
injury and a claimant’s disability.”622  The court concluded that the 
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employee does not need to prove the work-related injury is the sole cause of 
the disability, but only that it is a substantial contributing factor to the 
disability.623 
The second flaw with the prior wage loss determination was that the 
administrative law judge presumed the occlusion was the cause of any wage 
loss.624  There was nothing in the record that reflected when Brockel was 
released to return to his prior form of work after he was disabled by his 
shoulder injury.625  Brockel had only received activity restrictions and could 
have been provided rehabilitation services, but this was ruled out when WSI 
sent the notice to discontinue his benefits.626  The administrative law 
judge’s ruling ultimately ignored “WSI’s obligation to consider vocational 
evidence.”627  The court then noted any future functional capacity 
assessments must take into account both the work-related injury and the 
occlusion.628 
Justice Sandstrom dissented from the majority with respect to the part 
of the opinion where it reverses and remands.629  Justice Sandstrom asserted 
that the majority offered its independent findings in replace of the agency’s 
findings.630  Justice Sandstrom noted that WSI gave proper notice and WSI 
made its finding on that basis.631  He also stated that the majority should not 
have decided on the shoulder injury because it was not a presented issue, 
and that the majority’s findings were contrary to the findings of fact located 
in the record.632  Justice Sandstrom found that the findings of fact in the 
record prove that Brockel’s shoulder injury “does not preclude him from 
working.”633 Justice Sandstrom would have affirmed “on the basis of a 
proper application of the standard of review.”634 
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